Bravo Google: well played, indeed

You really have to hand it to those Google boys, they are smart.  And they really know how to play the game of business, don’t they?

Let’s recap just a little, but we have to think way back to the very beginnings of the presidential primary season.  Google was humming along as usual, with no end in site to their dominance in the online advertising world.  Yahoo, the distant number 2 in the industry, was fading quickly.  Amid mounting pressure to change the downward trend, Yahoo was presented with a “damned if you do and damned if you don’t” proposition from Microsoft, to become part of the perpetual evil empire.

Google wasted little time in parrying this potentially formidable threat to the company’s dominance.  A combined Microsoft-Yahoo would still have laid claim to less than a third of the market share that Google commanded, but it would have aligned the coffers of Microsoft (which is still trying to figure out how to spell Internet) with the braintrust that practically invented web portal and search.

Now, it’s true that a Microsoft-Yahoo merger would have been an utter failure.  But, the potential for a sea change was there, and Google didn’t hesitate to act.  Through incredibly adept maneuvering, Google positioned itself as the white knight saving the poor damsel in distress from the clutches of the dragon.  Google and Yahoo struck a deal for Google to serve search advertising for Yahoo. And, the world rejoiced!

But, Google had to know that a Google-Yahoo deal to corner 90% of the online advertising market would come under intense scrutiny from federal regulators, didn’t they?  Of course, they knew.  They knew because  the main sticking point in the Microsoft-Yahoo merger talks was the scrutiny that the new entity would come under for controlling less than 80% of the web email market.

And now, Google has pulled out of the deal with Yahoo citing concerns from federal regulators.  So, what did Google get out of all this?  Well, before the Microsoft offer, Yahoo traded at about $20 per share and Microsoft traded at nearly $35 per share.  Today, Yahoo is even weaker at $14 per share, while Microsoft is at $22 per share, making a merger politically difficult for both companies.  So, Google is secure in the knowledge that it will continue to own online advertising for a very, very long time, and it didn’t even cost them a penny to do it.

Bravo!

Web-IV convergence: social networks and applications

The news is coming fast and furious. I thought the dot-com boom was life at Internet speed, but this is ridiculous. It wasn’t all that long ago that Web2.0 was just a bunch of WYSIWYG tools to ease development of web content. In that respect, Web2.0 did for the Internet what Microsoft Word did for computer word processing. (Think back in horror to the days of color-coded key combinations for document formatting with the old WordPerfect.) That is, Web2.0 made it easy for anyone to publish content to the web.

It was only a few short months ago, on May 24, 2007, that Facebook led the next evolution and brought applications to the masses by introducing the Facebook Platform. Web-IV is the ultimate convergence, and this was one of the defining events in taking us from Web2.0 to Web-IV. Think about it, until this point, Web2.0 gave people easy ways to produce content (blogs, wikis) and to aggregate content (mashups). But May 24th marked the day that interactive, feature-rich applications were elevated to that same social status. It became simple for anyone (with just a little technical know-how) to build an application and have it immediately used by the ready and eager masses.

That was ground-shaking, earth-shattering, sea-changing. But, alas, that was sooooo May. Now Google and its posse are riding out trying to tame the wild west of social networking with OpenSocial. And, it’s so much more than just a common technology for developing applications on social networks. Lost in all the coverage is the fact that this is the first significant move to finally, finally bring all the social networks together.

I fully expect OpenSocial to, first and foremost, provide a “single sign-on” level of interoperability to the social networking space. I would be shocked if one of the first applications developed on OpenSocial wasn’t some way to better share information and connections across the various social networks. It’s inevitable.

The natural course of all communications networks have followed the same path. One need only review the history of the telephone industry to understand the phenomenon. First, there are a lot of small network providers, who all fight really hard to protect their “walled gardens.” But, as Metcalf’s Law explains, the value of a network grows as the square of the number of nodes in the network. So, after a while, a small number of dominant players emerge and gobble up all the smaller networks.

So now the question becomes, will Google become the Ma Bell of social networking in our new Web-IV world?

Google has cellular industry caught in a pincer movement

While Apple utilized a frontal assault on the cellular carriers, Google is attacking with a classic pincer movement. Let’s explore the underlying differences between these companies and how that drives the different strategies.

Apple is the preeminent consumer electronics brand today. No consumer goods company carries the same cachet that Apple does. No other brand has such a rabid, fight-to-the-death following. And nobody gets more out of their consumers than Apple. Steve Jobs use of the stage and the buzz ever-surrounding Macworld conferences is enough to draw the spotlight away from CES and the entire rest of the consumer electronics industry.

With Apple’s strengths being in designing consumer devices and the fervor of its devout followers, Apple’s foray into the mobile space was, of course, from a strictly consumer-facing, handset manufacturer angle. Apple wanted to create a device the way it wanted to create it. And, Apple knew absolutely that their device would sell to a significant number of people.

The carriers are always looking for a competitive edge against their oligopoly-brethren, and their tried-and-true approach to gaining such an edge is through the use of exclusive agreements. Knowing this, Apple played a game of “let’s make a deal.” Apple offered an inside track on cheap and easy acquisition of legions of the most loyal consumers in the world. In exchange, Apple wanted the power of control over the platform. There was no way a carrier would give up control over handset requirements without getting exclusivity in return. This deal was first offered to Verizon, which declined. AT&T, which as Cingular had been one of the more conservative of the carriers, wanted to inject new life into AT&T Mobility, so they grabbed for the brass ring. And, as I touched on in an earlier post, AT&T must have expected that Apple, owing to its history of maintaining tight control over its technology, would keep the platform closed. So, for AT&T, this probably didn’t seem like such a huge risk and came with a big upside.

Google’s strengths and history led it down a different path. While Google has a brand that takes a backseat to nobody, Google does not manufacture physical goods. Google provides web-based software services. So, it’s too big of a stretch to think that people will flock to use a phone that is running a Google-OS just for the sake of it. But, what leverage Google does have lies mostly in its substantial war chest. Through the threat of entering the 700 MHz auction, with the very real prospect that it could win such an auction, Google can force the carriers to the table.

The threat is what a Google-owned spectrum would mean to the cellular industry. First, let’s set aside the notion that Google would actually enter the cellular carrier market. That’s just too far from Google’s core and would require too great a commitment of resources to physical infrastructure. What’s much more likely is that Google would license the spectrum to one or more of the carriers, but that would come with many strings attached. In essence, Google could use the carriers’ own arguments and tactics (“It’s our network/spectrum, and if you want to use it, you’ll follow our rules.”) against them. One such string would undoubtedly be that any device running on that spectrum would have to be Google-powered.

So, in dealing with Google, the carriers are between a rock and a hard place. They are not “induced” to work with Google by the allure of advertising revenue splits, they are compelled to do so. Either they negotiate some revenue split now (with the greater portion of that split going to Google, of course), or have a worse deal force-fed to them later. Either way, the carriers are losing their tight grip on the mobile universe, which is a good thing.

Even though the unspoken Apple-Google alliance’s efforts against the cellular carriers is ultimately leading to a more open mobile network (hooray!), let’s not forget that this is in no way an altruistic endeavor on either company’s part. Apple was forced by consumer backlash to open its platform. Google is simply looking to expand its advertising reach into the emerging mobile arena. In this respect, Google seems to be setting itself up as the default advertising platform for mobile devices in a manner eerily similar to how Microsoft leveraged the Wintel monopoly to win the browser wars with Netscape.

Let’s just hope that Google isn’t using the banner of openness as a trojan horse for creating its own monopoly, but stays true to its”Do no evil” mantra, because mobile users in the US have been oppressed for too long already.