While Apple utilized a frontal assault on the cellular carriers, Google is attacking with a classic pincer movement. Let’s explore the underlying differences between these companies and how that drives the different strategies.
Apple is the preeminent consumer electronics brand today. No consumer goods company carries the same cachet that Apple does. No other brand has such a rabid, fight-to-the-death following. And nobody gets more out of their consumers than Apple. Steve Jobs use of the stage and the buzz ever-surrounding Macworld conferences is enough to draw the spotlight away from CES and the entire rest of the consumer electronics industry.
With Apple’s strengths being in designing consumer devices and the fervor of its devout followers, Apple’s foray into the mobile space was, of course, from a strictly consumer-facing, handset manufacturer angle. Apple wanted to create a device the way it wanted to create it. And, Apple knew absolutely that their device would sell to a significant number of people.
The carriers are always looking for a competitive edge against their oligopoly-brethren, and their tried-and-true approach to gaining such an edge is through the use of exclusive agreements. Knowing this, Apple played a game of “let’s make a deal.” Apple offered an inside track on cheap and easy acquisition of legions of the most loyal consumers in the world. In exchange, Apple wanted the power of control over the platform. There was no way a carrier would give up control over handset requirements without getting exclusivity in return. This deal was first offered to Verizon, which declined. AT&T, which as Cingular had been one of the more conservative of the carriers, wanted to inject new life into AT&T Mobility, so they grabbed for the brass ring. And, as I touched on in an earlier post, AT&T must have expected that Apple, owing to its history of maintaining tight control over its technology, would keep the platform closed. So, for AT&T, this probably didn’t seem like such a huge risk and came with a big upside.
Google’s strengths and history led it down a different path. While Google has a brand that takes a backseat to nobody, Google does not manufacture physical goods. Google provides web-based software services. So, it’s too big of a stretch to think that people will flock to use a phone that is running a Google-OS just for the sake of it. But, what leverage Google does have lies mostly in its substantial war chest. Through the threat of entering the 700 MHz auction, with the very real prospect that it could win such an auction, Google can force the carriers to the table.
The threat is what a Google-owned spectrum would mean to the cellular industry. First, let’s set aside the notion that Google would actually enter the cellular carrier market. That’s just too far from Google’s core and would require too great a commitment of resources to physical infrastructure. What’s much more likely is that Google would license the spectrum to one or more of the carriers, but that would come with many strings attached. In essence, Google could use the carriers’ own arguments and tactics (“It’s our network/spectrum, and if you want to use it, you’ll follow our rules.”) against them. One such string would undoubtedly be that any device running on that spectrum would have to be Google-powered.
So, in dealing with Google, the carriers are between a rock and a hard place. They are not “induced” to work with Google by the allure of advertising revenue splits, they are compelled to do so. Either they negotiate some revenue split now (with the greater portion of that split going to Google, of course), or have a worse deal force-fed to them later. Either way, the carriers are losing their tight grip on the mobile universe, which is a good thing.
Even though the unspoken Apple-Google alliance’s efforts against the cellular carriers is ultimately leading to a more open mobile network (hooray!), let’s not forget that this is in no way an altruistic endeavor on either company’s part. Apple was forced by consumer backlash to open its platform. Google is simply looking to expand its advertising reach into the emerging mobile arena. In this respect, Google seems to be setting itself up as the default advertising platform for mobile devices in a manner eerily similar to how Microsoft leveraged the Wintel monopoly to win the browser wars with Netscape.
Let’s just hope that Google isn’t using the banner of openness as a trojan horse for creating its own monopoly, but stays true to its”Do no evil” mantra, because mobile users in the US have been oppressed for too long already.